Hand over a verifiable service image

Build scenario C's quote service, transfer it to a disposable local registry and call the transferred image from an independent Docker daemon. Optionally create and verify a real Attest receipt with a demonstration identity.

Expected result and prerequisites

The quote returns the same 9,180 cents through container REST and MCP after the original project and bundles are removed. Evidence retains actual build, transfer and immutable remote identities. With Attest enabled, native verification accepts the original proof and refuses altered proof.

Use Python 3.11+, Git and Docker Engine/Buildx on a trusted Linux/macOS host. Docker must support the fixture's privileged nested Linux daemons; these are test infrastructure, not an untrusted-code sandbox. Preparation downloads public Apizr core/OCI/Attest 0.4.5, Linux target wheels and trusted tool/base images. The optional native tool is Continuum Attest 0.1.0 with pinned archive/executable hashes. No paid platform, production credential, organizational key or remote publication is used.

Download verified-delivery.zip, extract it outside the checkout and open verified-delivery/. It contains the scenario C quote files plus the repository's real registry/proof qualification drivers and their supporting fixtures. Product code is installed from PyPI, not this archive. All example data is fictional and GPL-3.0-or-later.

Run a build and local transfer

python run.py --output ../delivery-evidence

run.py creates a temporary fixture workspace, then runs the existing real authenticated TLS registry with independent builder/consumer daemons. It installs and activates the published OCI plugin into a separate store, generates the quote bundle through the installed core, prepares exact server-wheel hashes and grants only the documented build/push targets. Docker and OpenSSL create the registry and demonstration credentials; those are host/test procedures, not Apizr commands.

The fixture invokes real apizr plugins run ... build and push, exports the bundle evidence, deletes source/bundles, then makes real container REST/MCP calls. It checks authorization refusals, altered build inputs and interrupted transfer without treating an uncertain remote state as success.

Check the retained result

python - <<'PY'
import json
from pathlib import Path
root = Path('../delivery-evidence')
builds = json.loads((root / 'results.json').read_text())
pushes = json.loads((root / 'push-results.json').read_text())
calls = json.loads((root / 'application-delivery-proof.json').read_text())
assert len(builds) == len(pushes) == 2
assert all(b['result']['published'] is False for b in builds)
assert all(p['published'] and p['transfer_verified'] for p in pushes)
assert calls['source_removed'] and calls['bundles_removed'] and not calls['source_mounts']
assert calls['rest_result']['total_cents'] == 9180
assert calls['mcp_result'] == calls['rest_result']
print('Built, transferred, and called the quote through REST and MCP')
PY

image_id identifies the local engine image; a remote manifest digest is separate. build-response.result is not the whole extension envelope. Keep both plus delivery_plan, delivery_manifest and exported document hashes for review. Do not substitute a successful build for a verified transfer.

Optional Attest identity and tampered-proof refusal

Choose a new evidence directory:

python run.py --attest --output ../attest-evidence

The fixture generates a disposable private key, configures public signer trust independently, and runs a local RFC 3161 test authority. Exact signer/key/TSA grants are distinct from registry publication rights. Native Attest checks the receipt with that independent trust; altered manifest/signature/timestamp cases must refuse. attest-results.json and attest-refusals.json retain verified outcomes. Test private keys/authentication remain in disposable infrastructure; they are not exported as public proof.

The scope is verified OCI delivery; build not supervised by Attest. This proves neither scientific quality nor organizational approval. For proof transport and destination admission, see the exact optional contracts.

Limits, failures and cleanup

If Docker, nested daemon startup, base/tool acquisition, native Attest or a verification check is unavailable, this scenario is not verified. Inspect proof.log privately, correct the prerequisite and retry into a new output path. No assertion is replaced by a fake response. Preparation/build duration depends on the host and downloaded images; no fabricated performance target is claimed.

The fixture's finally cleanup removes its named containers, network, volume and fixture image. It never globally prunes Docker or deletes unrelated images. Evidence directories remain for your review; remove only those you created when finished. Returning to a known service image uses your host/platform procedure, not a native Apizr rollback command. Trunx handoff uses existing exported records, not an invented API.